An increasing reliance on solar and wind power has raised concern about system ability to consistently satisfy electricity demand. This paper examines countries' unilateral incentives to achieve supply security through capacity reserves and market integration in a multinational electricity market. Capacity reserves protect consumers against blackouts and extreme prices, but distort consumption and investment. Market integration alleviates supply constraints, but requires costly network reinforcement. Capacity reserves can be up-or downward distorted, but network investment is always insufficient in equilibrium. Capacity reserves are smaller when there are financial markets or when dispatched solely to resolve domestic supply constraints.
Introduction
Support schemes to increase the production of energy from renewable sources now are common in many parts of the world as part of a policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the dependence on energy imports. 1 The subsidization of renewable electricity often has sparked investments predominantly in solar and wind power. 2 The output ‡uctuations inherent to solar and wind power have subsequently raised concern about the ability to continuously satisfy demand in a system that relies on such intermittent electricity production.
In circumstances of a substantial shortfall of renewable output, the system operator may be forced to disconnect consumers from the grid in order to maintain system stability. Such rolling blackouts (curtailment) represent the most dramatic manifestation of supply shortage, but scarcity a¤ects consumers negatively also in less extreme circumstances. Price insensitive short-run demand for electricity and capacity constraints in production and transmission imply that the market-clearing spot price of electricity can be very high in event the system is supply constrained even if not on the verge of collapse. The tolerance for blackouts and extreme prices is very limited in advanced economies. A key feature of a viable electricity system based upon renewable electricity production therefore is to maintain a security of supply, i.e. ensure that there is adequate generation capacity to satisfy demand at acceptable consumer prices. 3 There are two main ways how countries can achieve supply security. The …rst is to keep capacity reserves as backup in event of supply shortages in the spot market. Reserves often are procured by the use of capacity mechanisms such as auctions for generation capacity. Typical mechanisms address the problem of blackouts by requiring that available production capacity has a su¢ cient reserve margin to prevent the loss of load probability from exceeding some target level. 4 They limit consumer price exposure by establishing trigger levels in the spot market above which capacity reserves are activated; see Neuho¤ et al. (2016) for a characterization of common mechanisms. 5;6 1 See, for instance, the EU Renewables Directive (2009/28/EC) for a formulation of such objectives. 2 Germany is a leading example of a country that has started a transition to an electricity system based on renewables. Approximately one fourth of the country's annual electricity production came from renewable sources in 2014. The corresponding …gure was 6% at the turn of the millennium. Two-thirds of this increase can be attributed to solar and wind power. The data were retrieved from www.iea.org/statistics / November 4, 2016. 3 The Union of the Electricity Industry in Europe (Eurelectric, 2006, p.15 ) de…nes security of electricity supply as "the ability of the electrical power system to provide electricity to end-users with a speci…ed level of continuity and quality in a sustainable manner." This de…nition appears to encompass curtailment alone, but in the subsequent discussion Eurelectric emphasizes that "energy prices can also have an in ‡uence on security of supply. For instance, if electricity prices were to rise enduringly to levels which were not a¤ordable for a substantial portion of customers (households and industry), there would be an impact on security of supply." Oren (2005) similarly views capacity reserves as an insurance both against curtailment and high prices. 4 The loss of load probability is the likelihood that available production capacity is insu¢ cient to cover demand within a given period. For instance, ERCOT (Texas) and PJM (North-East USA) apply the same "one day in ten years" loss of load criterion for reserve margins. France and Great Britain use a very similar criterion. 5 Trigger prices often are explicit. For instance, NEM (Eastern and Southern Australia) and PJM de…ne a speci…c price cap in the short-term market for situations of supply scarcity. Columbia and New England instead use capacity mechanisms based upon the more unusual reliability options. Producers are forced to issue call options for the contracted capacity reserve at some regulated strike price and to pay consumers the di¤erence between the spot price and the strike price. By way of this construction, consumers de facto pay the minimum of the strike price and the spot price for their electricity (Cramton et al., 2013) . 6 Trigger prices can also be implicit. In Sweden, for instance, the system operator activates the capacity reserve
The second solution is to increase network capacity and thereby improve the ‡ow of electricity within the system. Better market integration reduces the likelihood of supply shortage and lowers market prices by allowing demand and supply ‡uctuations in di¤erent parts of the network to o¤set one another. Network expansion is regulated and undertaken by the network owner.
In a multinational electricity market, the price e¤ects associated with capacity reserves and network investment propagate through to surrounding countries. Decisions at the national level concerning security of supply therefore run the risk of impairing the overall market performance insofar as local policy makers fail to fully account for the e¤ects of their decisions. The concerns expressed by the European Commission (2015, p.10) in the recent framework strategy for an Energy Union about "divergent national market arrangements" and a necessity to ensure that "capacity mechanisms and support for renewable electricity are fully in line with existing rules and do not distort the internal energy market" bear testimony to this perception.
Scope The purpose of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of the incentives for introducing capacity mechanisms in markets with intermittent renewable electricity generation.
It emphasizes the implications of and consequences for market integration by couching the problem in a multinational electricity market setting. A main objective is to identify and account for foreign external e¤ects and assess the overall welfare consequences of decentralized policy making associated with security of supply problems.
Model description I consider a theoretical model of two symmetric and interconnected national electricity markets. 7 Market integration is measured in terms of network reliability. The market is perfectly integrated and spot prices the same in both countries if the interconnection is fully operational. The two markets are separate and spot prices are set at the national level in the alternative scenario when the interconnection is down. Supply shortages sometimes arise because short-term demand is independent of the spot price of electricity (Joskow and Tirole, 2007) , renewable production is stochastic, and thermal production capacity is constrained.
There exists no market-clearing price in this case (Cramton and Stoft, 2006) . Instead, the price is set at a price cap. The capacity reserve required to cover supply shortages in the spot market is larger if the price cap is smaller because then long-term demand for electricity is higher and spot market-based investment in thermal capacity is smaller. 8 This is the well-known missing money problem in electricity markets; see e.g. Joskow (2007) and Hogan (2013) . Conversely, a larger capacity reserve implies that a smaller price cap is su¢ cient to generate enough marketwhenever demand in the spot market exceeds supply at a price equal to the maximal observed supply bid. The capacity reserve is supplied to clear the spot market at this price. This means that the spot price of electricity in Sweden cannot exceed the short-term marginal production cost of the most expensive unit in the market if the spot market is otherwise competitive. 7 This is really a model of market integration between jurisdictions, where each jurisdiction unilaterally decides the size of its capacity reserve and network investment. In the present context, these jurisdictions are countries, but one could equally well assume them to be states, such as in the U.S. 8 Reliability criteria, such as those mentioned in footnote 4, are strict. Accordingly, rolling blackouts are very infrequent events in most restructured electricity markets. A sector inquiry in the EU found one single instance of consumers being disconnected during the last …ve years. This happened during a heat wave in Poland in August 2015 (European Commission, 2016) . For simplicity, the model assumes a target level of curtailment equal to zero. based investment in thermal capacity to cover demand. A larger capacity reserve therefore is equivalent to a higher security of supply, all else equal.
Findings The socially optimal capacity reserve balances the marginal bene…t of an increased security of supply against excessive consumption and insu¢ cient thermal investment resulting from a downward distortion in the long-run (expected) price of electricity. These e¤ects spill over to the foreign country in an integrated market, but policy makers that maximize domestic surplus account for none of them. Still, decentralized policy making does not entail any welfare loss if market integration is perfect and capacity reserves are e¢ ciently deployed. Symmetry then implies that decision makers e¤ectively internalize all externalities abroad of changes in the domestic capacity reserve, and the social optimum can be implemented as a Nash equilibrium.
Equilibrium capacity reserves are distorted in the general case of partial (imperfect) market integration, but the magnitude and direction of the distortion depends on two opposing e¤ects.
On the one hand, the probability of a supply shortage is relatively small under market integration because of trade and imperfect correlation of renewable output. This portfolio e¤ ect of market integration calls for smaller capacity reserves in social optimum. On the other hand, an integrated market allows for a more e¢ cient use of a given capacity reserve. This cost e¢ ciency of market integration increases the socially optimal capacity reserve. The net foreign externality is negative (positive) if the portfolio e¤ect dominates cost e¢ ciency, in which case the equilibrium capacity reserve is too large (small) in a partially integrated market relative to the social optimum. I endogenize market integration by allowing investment in network reliability, either at the central level to maximize total welfare, or at the national level. An increase in the capacity reserve decreases (increases) the marginal value of market integration if the foreign externality is negative (positive) and thereby reduces (increases) network investment. This strategic substitutability (complementarity) between capacity reserves and market integration causes downward distortions of network reliability because the capacity reserve is too large (small) from a social point of view under a negative (positive) foreign externality. Hence, investment in network reliability is unambiguously downward distorted. Decentralized network investment exacerbates this underinvestment problem further insofar as domestic policy makers ignore the positive e¤ects abroad of improved market integration.
A main motive for capacity reserves is a concern over prices when the spot market is supply constrained. An obvious solution would seem to be that consumers worried about prices instead sign …nancial contracts to hedge their spot price risk. I show that the socially optimal capacity reserve is indeed close to zero if consumers can purchase call options in a competitive …nancial market that renders the equilibrium option price equal to the expected option payment. The market diversi…es away all risk in this case. But consumers would still prefer the capacity mechanism because the capacity payments to producers are distributed across all consumers, even those who do not demand any hedge, whereas the …nancial contract is a private cost. A policy maker who attached more weight to speci…c consumer interests would have an incentive to introduce capacity reserves even if ine¢ cient. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether sellers can always diversify away all risk. For instance, they can be liquidity constrained retailers or producers. 9 Capacity reserves arise in equilibrium and can be welfare improving even under …nancial contracting in case buyers and sellers strictly bene…t from risk reduction. I …nally consider the e¤ect of de…ning supply shortage at the national level instead of at the aggregate level, and requiring that capacity reserves be directed towards solving domestic capacity problems. The resulting dispatch of the capacity reserve then is ine¢ cient, which makes market-based outcomes comparatively more attractive from an e¢ ciency viewpoint. This reduces the socially optimal and equilibrium capacity reserve.
Related literature Notwithstanding the policy discussion surrounding electricity markets with renewable production, this paper is one of only a few to endogenize the security of electricity supply. An explanation for the lack of research can be that standard economic theory posits that speci…c measures are unnecessary to ensure the security of supply. A competitive "energy-only" market-where customers only pay for the amount of energy they consume and generators only are paid for the amount of energy they produce-is su¢ cient. Price hikes in times of scarcity will create just enough rent to render the socially optimal investments in thermal capacity privately pro…table (Hogan, 2005; Oren, 2005 and Joskow, 2007) .
The e¢ ciency of an energy-only market arises under ideal market conditions where demand is price sensitive enough always to deliver some, possibly very high, price that clears the market.
It is arguable whether current electricity markets …t this description, not least because many households are on contracts that do not incite them to respond to short-term price signals. Cramton and Stoft (2006) and Cramton et al. (2013) argue that appropriately designed capacity mechanisms are an e¢ cient way of resolving associated supply constraints. Joskow and Tirole (2007) show in their seminal contribution that price insensitive short-term demand alone is insu¢ cient to vindicate capacity mechanisms on e¢ ciency grounds. Instead, capacity obligations have the potential to improve e¢ ciency if curtailment is ine¢ cient or if price signals are distorted, for example as a result of market power or because of regulatory intervention. Joskow and Tirole (2007) explore in detail capacity obligations in relation to imperfect competition. Creti and Fabra (2007) and Schwenen (2014) illustrate in a similar vein how capacity reserves mitigate strategic withholding of production from the spot market.
There can be reasons for maintaining capacity reserves even in a competitive electricity market with e¢ cient curtailment. E¢ ciency requires that the price cap is set at the consumer cost of involuntary rationing, the value of lost load (VOLL), so that consumers on average are indi¤erent between being rationed or not in scarcity situations (Stoft, 2002) . The general applicability of such a policy can be disputed, not only because VOLL is di¢ cult to estimate correctly, but also because it may be politically infeasible to permit the electricity price to 9 An illustrative example is the California electricity market at the turn of the millennium. The price hedge consisted of a regulated retail price with retailers carrying the full spot price risk. All three investor-owned retailers subsequently ran into serious …nancial di¢ culties as spot prices soared to record levels in the summer of 2000, and one of them went bankrupt. See Wolak (2003) for diagnosis of the famous California electricity crisis. Producers carry the spot price risk under the system of reliability options, unless they themselves manage to hedge this risk. Neuho¤ et al. (2016) discuss the distribution of risks associated with reliability options. increase by a factor of 100 or more above its average level to achieve VOLL (Cramton et al., 2013) .
Furthermore, investors may question the credibility of VOLL pricing, in which case the desired investments will not come about (Joskow and Tirole, 2007) . Neuho¤ et al. (2016, p.258) argue that trigger prices must be set su¢ ciently low in capacity mechanisms else they would "clearly a¤ect the social acceptance of the energy market design." 10 The present paper incorporates the idea of politically acceptable prices by assuming that supply constraints has negative market external consequences for a subset of consumers. Policy makers account for these consumer e¤ects in the choice of capacity reserves. The equilibrium capacity reserve (and price cap) balances the marginal bene…t of protecting consumers against blackouts and high prices against the price distortions to long-run demand and thermal investment. 11 Placing the problem in a multinational electricity market setting permits an analysis of the interaction between capacity reserves and market integration and to shed light on consequences of decentralized policy making. Meyer and Gore (2015) Structure of the paper Section 2 presents the model and explores the basic trade-o¤ associated with capacity reserves in the two polar cases of national electricity markets and perfect market integration. The intermediary case of partial market integration and the consequences of decentralized policy making for equilibrium capacity reserves and network investment are analyzed in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 introduces …nancial markets. Section 6 considers national allocation rules for capacity reserves. Finally, Section 7 concludes with some policy implications.
Capacity reserves in national or perfectly integrated markets
There are two countries, identical in terms of consumer preferences, income and production technologies. The benchmark model encompasses two polar degrees of market structure. The …rst case, indexed by N , is that of autarchy by which electricity markets are entirely national.
Instead, there are transmission lines with su¢ cient capacity to equalize the electricity price across the two countries in the second case of perfect market integration, indexed by I. I consider the intermediary case of partial market integration in Section 3.
1 0 See also European Commission (2016). 1 1 Joskow and Tirole (2007) discuss capacity reserves in relation to an exogenous price cap in the spot market.
The model
Demand There are two types of representative consumers: households and an electricity intensive industry. Households pay the expected (long-run) wholesale price of electricity E[p].
Their consumption q h therefore is independent of short-term price ‡uctuations and chosen to maximize quasi-linear utility u(q h ) + q 0 subject to the budget constraint
where q 0 is a numeraire good, T is a …xed fee, and Y 0 represents income. Let u( ) be twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing in the relevant domain and strictly concave, and assume that income Y 0 is large enough that the demand for both goods is strictly positive.
A representative energy intensive industry pays the short-run pricep and converts each MWh of electricity one-for-one into a good sold in the international market at price > 0 net of other variable operating costs. Energy intensive industries depend on stable production conditions to run e¢ ciently and therefore cannot respond to short-term price increases by reducing electricity consumption. I therefore assume that the industry has inelastic demand for q n 0 MWh electricity independently ofp. In particular, the industry su¤ers an operating loss ifp > . Its surplus then equals q n ( p B(p )). The term B( ) represents the shadow cost of the loss, which is continuously di¤erentiable, increasing and convex for allp > , with B(p ) = B 0 (0) = 0 for allp . The asymmetry between pro…ts and losses could stem for instance from liquidity constraints or from pro…t taxes that treat operating gains and losses asymmetrically, i.e. losses are not fully deductible. B( ) represents a negative externality that creates a demand for capacity reserves to reduce price risk. One would expect the industry also to hedge risk in the …nancial market or through long-term contracts. I consider …nancial contracting in Section 5. For now, it is su¢ cient to note that the analysis under …nancial contracting is qualitatively the same as below and in Sections 3 and 4 under the plausible assumption of risk aversion on both the buyer and the seller side, as in the seminal contribution by Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) . The assumption that only household demand is long-run price sensitive is for simplicity.
Supply Electricity is competitively supplied in the short and the long-run. Let c(x) be the variable cost (fuel cost, variable O&M) of producing the xth MWh of thermal electricity in the country, a cost that is strictly increasing, convex and continuously di¤erentiable. There is also a capital cost of installing thermal capacity that for simplicity is assumed to be constant and equal to > 0 per MWe.
Renewable output (r 1 ; r 2 ) 2 [0; r] 2 in the two countries is intermittent (stochastic) and jointly distributed with cumulative distribution function F (r 1 ; r 2 ) and density f (r 1 ; r 2 ). Renewable production is symmetric, meaning f (r 1 ; r 2 ) = f (r 2 ; r 1 ) in the entire domain. Let the marginal distribution be F N (r), with density f N (r) = R r 0 f (r;r)dr. Denote by F I (r) the distribution of the average renewable output r = r 1 +r 2 2 :
Renewable electricity production has zero marginal production cost. The capacity is politically determined, so I treat it as exogenous throughout. Gains from electricity trade arise in a perfectly integrated market even if countries are ex ante symmetric insofar as renewable outputs r 1 and r 2 are imperfectly correlated.
Short-run equilibrium Assume that the market-based thermal capacity x (i.e. excluding any capacity reserve) is the same in both countries. The equilibrium price of electricity is implicitly de…ned by the market-clearing condition c 1 (p) + r = q h + q n = q if renewable output is large enough, where r indicates the renewable output in the representative country when electricity markets are national. If x < q, then there is no market clearing price for low realizations of renewable output. I assume that the wholesale price is set at a price cap p if the market fails to clear. Hence,p
identi…es the short-term price of electricity. 12 The price cap p is endogenous, but has no implications in the short-run besides redistributing income between consumers and electricity producers. Its importance will be apparent through its e¤ects on long-run demand and investment in thermal capacity.
Long-run equilibrium The long-run household demand D M ( p) and the market-based investment level X M ( p) in thermal capacity depend on the market structure M = N; I because the relevant distribution of renewable output does so. The point at which the marginal utility of electricity consumption equals the expected price de…nes the equilibrium household demand:
The corresponding market-based investment level in thermal capacity equates the expected scarcity rent of the marginal capacity with the marginal capital cost:
Demand is decreasing and market-based thermal investment is increasing in the price cap p; see
Capacity reserves The market-based supply of thermal capacity is insu¢ cient to cover demand for low realizations of renewable output, i.e. whenever r < D M ( p) + q n X M ( p), for any …nite price cap p. To maintain system stability, the system operator can either activate capacity reserves, or, if that option has been exhausted, disconnect consumers. If system balance were to be attained entirely by curtailment, this would yield a disconnection (loss of load) probability equal to F M (D M ( p) + q n X M ( p)) > 0. I assume that it is politically unacceptable for sys-tem operators to deliberately disconnect consumers. The remaining solution then is to procure enough capacity reserves that curtailment will not occur.
Under the assumption of national electricity markets, p N = P N (k) de…ned by
represents the smallest price cap that would generate precisely enough market-based investment to ensure that total thermal capacity equals total demand given the national capacity reserve k. For any price cap above P N (k), there would be overinvestment and under-utilization of the capacity reserve. Conversely, there would not be enough capacity in the market to cover demand in all possible contingencies for a price cap below P N (k).
Denote by k = k 1 +k 2 2 the average capacity reserve under perfect market integration, where (k 1 ; k 2 ) are the capacity reserves in the two countries. The price cap p I = P I (k) de…ned by
is the smallest one required to generate enough market-based investment to ensure security of supply in the integrated market given the average capacity reserve k. 13;14 I assume that the activated capacity reserve is divided equally among the two countries under scarcity, i.e. whenever r = r 1 +r 2 2 < k. This allocation rule is ex post e¢ cient here because it equates the marginal thermal costs across the two countries. The price cap is smaller when the capacity reserve is larger under both market structures M = N; I:
For future reference, let
be the minimal capacity reserve necessary to fully protect the electricity intensive industry from losses under market structure M .
Most wholesale electricity markets feature a bid cap above which the market participants cannot submit bids or o¤ers. In some markets, this bid cap is set at VOLL. 15 The price cap analyzed in this paper is the one implied by the target loss of load probability (which is zero) and the size of the capacity reserve, and can be substantially smaller than the bid cap. Hence, 1 3 In the present context, the price cap PM (k) is implicitly de…ned by the size of the capacity reserve. Alternatively, one can consider an explicit price cap p and an implied capacity reserve KM ( p) = DM ( p) + qn XM ( p). The two approaches are formally equivalent in a national electricity market, but may have di¤erent implications in an integrated market because of strategic interaction. 1 4 One could instead specify a target loss of load of load probability 0. Within this more general framework, DM ( PM ) + qn XM ( PM ) = k + F 1 M ( ) characterizes the price cap PM (k; ) that for a capacity reserve k yields precisely enough market-based investment in thermal capacity to generate a loss of load probability under market structure M . Actual s are very small. For instance, an annual loss of load probability of 0:1 days implies < 0:0003. For simplicity, I let = 0, such that PM (k) = PM (k; 0). 1 5 Examples include ERCOT (Texas) and NEM (Eastern and Southern Australia). situations may occur in which capacity reserves are activated at prices below VOLL and without there being any substantial risk of rolling blackouts. 16 For renewable output r k, there is enough thermal output o¤ered at market terms to clear the market at the short-term marginal cost. If renewable output falls below the critical level r < k, then it becomes necessary to invoke some of the capacity reserve to avoid supply shortage. In this case, the capacity reserve is bid into the market at the price cap. Hence, the short-term price of electricity can be characterized by
as a function of renewable output r and the capacity reserve k, where x M (k) = X M ( P M (k)) is the market-based thermal capacity, and r and k represent averages across the two countries if markets are perfectly integrated.
Henceforth, I make the simplifying assumption that
This assumption implies that the electricity intensive industry earns an operating pro…t under normal market conditions, i.e. as long as the market clears at the marginal thermal production cost. In other words, the industry runs into pro…tability problems only in situations of supply scarcity, i.e. when r < k.
Because of the price cap, the income generated in the market is insu¢ cient to cover the production cost of the capacity reserves. Additional capacity payments must therefore be put in place in order to ensure supply security whenever the (average) production of renewable electricity falls below k. The capacity payments are assumed to be lump-sum and will not play any role in what follows. For the sake of completeness, I derive the least cost capacity payments in Appendix A.2.
Household, industry and producer surplus As the industry's marginal utility of income is larger than that of the households, it is socially optimal that households …nance the entire capacity payment in this model (which is also technically convenient and politically plausible).
Letting q M (k) = D M ( P M (k))+q n denote consumption in the representative country as a function of the (average) capacity reserve k, the expected consumer surplus becomes
The terms on the …rst row above are the gross utility of electricity consumption minus the expected payments. The …rst term on the second row is the expected shadow cost of the industry loss. The …nal term is the capacity payment T M (k). The optimal capacity reserve features a trade-o¤ between insurance and e¢ ciency, but is nonetheless di¤erent from a standard moral hazard problem: it is the electricity intensive industry that is exposed to price risk, but the households that pay the insurance cost in terms of the capacity payment.
An increase in the capacity reserve reduces the expected price of electricity. The …rst term below is the direct bene…t of redistributing income from the power producers to consumers (the quantity e¤ect is of second-order importance):
The second term is the marginal expected security of supply (see Appendix A.8 for the details):
One the one hand, an increase in the capacity reserve reduces the maximal price, which tends to increase the security of supply. On the other hand, a larger capacity reserve crowds out marketbased investment in thermal capacity and thereby increases the probability that the market cannot clear, which tends to reduce the security of supply. Because of crowding out, a higher capacity reserve need not necessarily be associated with a higher expected security of supply. 17
The corresponding expected pro…t of the electricity producers equals
on generation pro…t of increasing the capacity reserve is negative, excluding the e¤ect on the capacity payment. Besides redistributing income to the consumers, the price reduction also drives a wedge between the marginal long-run cost of thermal capacity and the marginal willingness to pay for electricity. The second term is the marginal ine¢ ciency associated with this price distortion:
Instead of underinvesting relative to the competitive equilibrium, as would be the case under imperfect competition, the power industry is actually overinvesting (in terms of the sum of market-based investment and the capacity reserve). Overinvestment relative to the competitive equilibrium creates a markdown, M (k). This price distortion is, moreover, increasing in the size of the capacity reserve 0 (25) in Appendix A.1.
The socially optimal capacity reserve
Aggregate welfare in the representative country is the sum of consumer and producer surplus as a function of the domestic capacity reserve k when electricity markets are national. The capacity payment merely represents a lump-sum transfer between households and electricity producers and therefore has no bearing on aggregate welfare in this model (hence, it is not important for the welfare analysis that the capacity market is fully competitive as long as the capacity reserve is dispatched in an e¢ cient manner). Symmetry, full price equalization, e¢ cient dispatch of the capacity reserve and lump-sum capacity payments imply that the welfare is the same in both countries under perfect market integration and a function of the average capacity reserve k.
Hence, the welfare in the representative country can be written as
for both market structures M = N; I.
I assume throughout that the problem of optimizing the capacity reserve is well-behaved under both market structures: 18
Solving the …rst-order condition yields the following result (the proof is in Appendix A.3):
Proposition 1 Assume that electricity markets are either national or perfectly integrated. The socially optimal capacity reserve k f b M 2 (0; k M ) under market structure M = N; I entails a trade-o¤ between the marginal bene…t of increased security of supply against the marginal cost of distorting consumption and investment:
The social optimum can be implemented as a pay-o¤ dominant Nash equilibrium under both market structures if countries set capacity reserves non-cooperatively to maximize domestic welfare.
The assumption that capacity reserves are set by policy makers in each country in a decentral-ized and non-cooperative manner does not necessarily represent any large source of ine¢ ciency.
Each country de facto internalizes the welfare e¤ect abroad in their choice of capacity reserve in case of symmetry, perfect market integration and if capacity reserves are allocated in an ex post e¢ cient manner.
Comparative statics The trade-o¤ facing policy makers is qualitatively the same independently of whether electricity markets are national of perfectly integrated. However, the magnitudes of the marginal e¤ects di¤er between the two market structures. On the one hand, a fully integrated electricity market allows for a more e¢ cient use of a given total capacity reserve k 1 + k 2 because reserves can be activated in such a manner as to increase e¢ ciency by equalizing marginal thermal production costs across countries. This cost e¢ ciency of market integration can be represented as the ratio of the expected cost distortion under market integration over the expected cost distortion when markets are national,
and tends to increase the socially optimal capacity reserve under full market integration relative the case when electricity markets are national.
On the other hand, the probability of a shortage of renewable electricity is relatively smaller under market integration because of trade and the imperfect correlation of renewable output.
This portfolio e¤ ect of market integration can be represented as the adjusted probability that the capacity reserve is invoked under market integration relative to the adjusted probability that it is invoked in the national market,
and tends to reduce the socially optimal capacity reserve under full market integration relative the case when electricity markets are national. 19 The e¤ect of market integration on the socially optimal capacity reserve depends on the relative magnitudes of those two e¤ects (the proof is in Appendix A.4):
Proposition 2 The socially optimal capacity reserve is larger under perfect market integration compared to the case when electricity markets are national (k f b I > k f b N ) if cost e¢ ciency dominates the portfolio e¤ ect of market integration:
The opposite result holds if the inequality is reversed so that the portfolio e¤ ect dominates. 
Capacity reserves in partially integrated markets
The analysis has so far relied on assumptions that markets either are entirely national or perfectly integrated. This section allows markets to be partially integrated in the sense that there is trade between them, but trade ‡ows are sometimes restricted.
Model extension
The analysis of electricity markets under transmission constraints is notoriously di¢ cult, especially under the assumption of strategic interaction among players. One reason is that optimal behavior is discontinuous at trading volumes around which the constraint is just binding; see Holmberg and Philpott (2012) I also make a small reinterpretation of the time frame of the model. The analysis in Section 2 was cast in terms of the long-term problem of ensuring enough thermal investment to cover demand while simultaneously avoiding price spikes. Many countries in the EU actually are in a situation of overcapacity (European Commission, 2016) . Instead, renewable production has driven down prices so far that the expected market revenue is insu¢ cient to cover the …xed costs of keeping thermal capacity available for the spot market. Assume now that is the …xed cost of keeping a unit of thermal capacity available and c( ) its variable production cost. Consider the intermediary problem of keeping enough thermal capacity online to ensure supply security.
The timing of the game is as follows. The policy makers in the two countries procure capacity reserves (k 1 ; k 2 ) in the …rst stage. Network reliability is realized, subsequent to which the markets are either perfectly integrated or national. Consumers decide how much electricity to purchase and power producers how much thermal capacity to make available to the short-term market depending on the market structure M = N; I. Finally, renewable output is realized in the two countries. The real-time wholesale market clears all prices if renewable output and/or transmission capacity is su¢ cient to handle the residual ‡ow of electricity between markets.
Otherwise capacity reserves are activated in one or both markets. 20;21 2 0 An alternative timing would be to assume that consumers and power producers make their choices prior to the revelation of market structure. Demand and thermal supply in each country would then depend on the full range of price caps ( pN1; pN2; pI ). The trade-o¤ facing policy makers would remain qualitatively intact, but the analysis of decentralized policy making would be obscured by an intractability of second-order conditions. 2 1 One could also maintain a long-term framework and assume that network owners with probability make an incremental investment to remove bottlenecks. I endogenize in Section 4. The expected welfare in country i simply becomes the weighted average
under this structure, where k = k i +k j 2 represents the average capacity reserve. The corresponding expected welfare equals W (k; k) in the representative country under symmetric capacity reserves,
Equilibrium capacity reserves
Consider the social optimum as a benchmark. The …rst-best optimal capacity reserve k f b ( )
is symmetric and trades-o¤ the marginal e¤ect in the integrated market against the marginal e¤ect when markets are national:
Now let policy makers in each country set their capacity reserves non-cooperatively to maximize the domestic welfare W (k i ; k j ). The …rst-order condition becomes
in symmetric equilibrium, k 1 = k 2 = k ( ). Whereas an electricity market with zero or full integration generates the e¢ cient outcome in the present model, the market with partial integration does not. By comparing equilibrium condition (16) with the optimality condition (15), it is quite obvious that the decentralized (non-cooperative) equilibrium generally will be ine¢ cient because the policy maker in the home country does not take into account the marginal e¤ect W 0 I (k)=2 abroad of expanding the capacity reserve at home. What is less clear, is whether decentralized policy making leads to upward or downward distortions of the capacity reserve under partial market integration.
To evaluate the e¤ects of decentralized policy making, consider the symmetric capacity reserve k 1 = k 2 = (t; ) implicitly de…ned by the solution to 1+t 2
The parameter t measures the degree to which policy makers internalize the externality abroad of changes in the domestic capacity reserve. Policy makers internalize the full e¤ect if t = 1, in which case the …rst-best solution obtains: (1; ) = k f b ( ). The non-cooperative solution obtains in the opposite case when policy makers do not internalize any of the e¤ects abroad:
The di¤erence between the socially optimal capacity reserve and the non-cooperative solution equals
The denominator of (18) is strictly positive by assumption (9). Hence, decentralized policy making leads to downward (upward) distortions in the equilibrium capacity reserve if the foreign externality is positive (negative), which is very intuitive. The sign of the externality in turn depends on the relative strengths of the marginal e¤ects of market integration: 
A marginal increase in the domestic capacity reserve increases the security of supply even abroad in an integrated market, but the lower price cap exacerbates the distortions to consumption and investments abroad. The marginal distortion owing to an increase in the capacity reserve is small (large) in magnitude compared to the supply security e¤ect if the cost e¢ ciency of market integration is strong (weak). The foreign externality is positive (negative) in this case.
To summarize (the proof is in Appendix A.5):
Proposition 3 Assume that the electricity markets are partially integrated, 2 (0; 1), and that the countries choose capacity reserves non-cooperatively to maximize domestic welfare. The ca- 
Network investment to increase market integration
The price spikes associated with losses in renewable output can be mitigated either by means of capacity reserves or by market integration. Capacity reserves achieve this by imposing an implicit cap on the price of electricity that incites su¢ cient thermal capacity to cover consumption.
Under market integration, output reductions in one country can be alleviated by increased production in other markets, thereby increasing productive e¢ ciency and limiting price increases.
Because of the price caps, the market provides insu¢ cient incentives to invest in thermal capacity and therefore has to be complemented by a mechanism that generates additional capacity payments. But the market also provides insu¢ cient incentives for improving network reliability.
Network owners typically earn their income from buying electricity at a low price in one area and selling it at a higher price in another when network constraints prevent all areas in the market from clearing at a single price. Unfortunately, the market generates no such congestion rent here. Either the transmission network is fully operational, in which case the market is integrated and there are no price di¤erences, or the network is completely down, in which case there is no trade between the countries. The lack of pro…tability is particularly visible in the present context, but applies more broadly to the problem of investing in network reliability. To account for this "missing money" problem in network reliability, I assume that the transmission networks are regulated. I consider both the case when regulation of network investment is centralized and when network investment is decentralized to the individual countries along with the choice of capacity reserves.
Centralized network investment
Under centralized network regulation, total reliability I is chosen to maximize the expected total welfare
across the two countries, taking the capacity reserves (k 1 ; k 2 ) as given and subject to the twice continuously di¤erentiable, increasing and strictly convex cost function C( ), where assumptions
I ) ensure existence of an interior solution. Each country chooses its capacity reserve to maximize the domestic welfare, taking network reliability I and the capacity reserve in the other country as given.
The optimal degree R I (k) of network reliability under centralized regulation is a trade-o¤ between the marginal value of market integration and the marginal cost of increasing network reliability
as a function of the symmetric capacity reserve k 1 = k 1 = k.
The equilibrium degree of market integration I (t) is implicitly characterized by the solution to I = R I ( (t; I )) as a function of the degree t to which policy makers internalize the foreign externality of capacity reserves. The …rst-best degree of market integration satis…es f b = I (1),
whereas the equilibrium degree of market integration equals I = I (0). Hence,
@ dt measures the e¤ect on market integration of decentralizing the choice of capacity reserves under centralized network regulation. The denominator of the fraction is positive in stable equilibrium (Dixit, 1986) . By
, an increase in the capacity reserve tends to increase the marginal value of market integration and drive up network investment if the foreign externality is positive. Capacity reserves and market integration are strategic complements in this case. Instead, capacity reserves and market integration are strategic substitutes if the foreign externality is negative. Whether equilibrium capacity reserves are above or below the social optimum under decentralized policy making also depends on the magnitudes of the two e¤ects of market integration, see (18) . Multiplying the two e¤ects yields
> 0, and the following result becomes immediately obvious:
Proposition 4 Market integration is unambiguously downward distorted if network investment is centralized and the countries choose capacity reserves non-cooperatively ( I < f b in stable equilibrium).
A decentralized choice of capacity reserves at the individual country level has an unambiguous e¤ect on market integration, despite the ambiguous e¤ect on capacity reserves. Capacity reserves are downward distorted if the cost e¢ ciency of market integration is comparatively strong, which in turn leads to a downward distortion of network investment by strategic complementarity.
Instead, capacity reserves are upward distorted if the portfolio e¤ect of market integration is comparatively strong, which again leads to a downward distortion of network investment, this time by strategic substitutability.
Decentralized network investment
Assume now that the two countries invest in domestic network reliability (y 1 ; y 2 ) in a noncooperative manner. The total network reliability becomes y 1 y 2 under the assumption that network reliability is stochastically independent across the two countries. The welfare in country i then equals
as a function of the capacity reserves (k i ; k j ) and network reliability (y i ; y j ).
Country i's welfare function is not necessarily quasi-concave in the domestic policy variables (k i ; y i ) although it is quasi-concave in each of the two arguments k i and y i . To circumvent any existence problems caused by non-concavity, I assume that k i and y i are decentralized to di¤erent policy makers in country i and chosen independently of one another. Any Nash equilibrium under a coordinated choice of (k i ; y i ) is contained in the set of Nash equilibria under a non-cooperative choice of k i and y i .
The total network reliability R N (k) = y 2 N (k) under decentralized network investment is characterized by the solution to
in interior symmetric equilibrium for a symmetric capacity reserve k 1 = k 2 = k. 22 The equilibrium degree of market integration N (t) under decentralized network investment is implicitly characterized by the solution to N = R N ( (t; N ) ) as a function of the degree t to which policy makers internalize the foreign externality of capacity reserves.
By following the same procedure as in the case of centralized network investment, it is easy to verify that market integration is smaller when domestic policy makers fail to internalize the external e¤ects of capacity reserves compared to the case when all such e¤ects are internalized:
. The next question is whether decentralized network investment further accentuates those distortions, i.e. whether N < I . To analyze this question, de…ne R(k; ) by
and (t; ) by = R( (t; ); ). By construction, I = (0; 1) and N = (0; 0), so that the di¤erence in network reliability between the two regimes becomes:
The denominator is positive in stable equilibrium, so that the e¤ect on market integration is determined by the direct e¤ect:
and it follows that:
Proposition 5 Market integration is further downward distorted if both network investment and capacity reserves are decided non-cooperatively by the two countries compared to the case when network investment is centralized ( N < I < f b in stable equilibrium).
Domestic investment in network reliability has positive e¤ects abroad because of improved market integration. A country concerned entirely with the maximization of domestic surplus neglects these positive external e¤ects, which causes the total network reliability to be smaller under decentralized than centralized network investment. Hence, the welfare distortions associated with decentralized decision making are additive in this model.
Financial markets
Capacity reserves are bene…cial because they protect consumers against blackouts and …nancial losses by reducing price spikes. An alternative way to hedge price risk would be through a …nancial market. This section investigates how …nancial markets interact with the socially optimal capacity reserves and those that would arise in equilibrium. In particular, would the distortions associated with decentralized policy making prevail or vanish in a competitive and well-functioning …nancial market?
Model extension
Let the industry in country i purchase q n call options for one MWh each with strike price s.
Assume that the …nancial market is perfectly competitive and that realized gains and losses are treated symmetrically in the …nancial market; the seller is risk neutral and can clear any losses one for one against other pro…ts. The equilibrium option price in country i then simply equals the expected option payment: 
Equilibrium capacity reserves vs. the social optimum
Assume that the capacity reserves are symmetric and so small that the option is in the money when renewable resources are scarce under both market structures, i.e. P I (k) > s and P N (k) > s.
2 3 It would be appropriate to denote the shadow cost B(minfpM (r; k); sg + v(ki; kj; s) ) under …nancial contracting because the electricity intensive industry turns an operating pro…t if and only if minfpM (r; k); sg+ v(ki; kj; s). However, the options are purchased prior to the resolution of any uncertainty and therefore represents a sunk cost at the production stage. To avoid uninteresting complications, I assume that only the variable part of the pro…t represents a shadow cost to the …rm.
The welfare e¤ect of an increase in the capacity reserve equals:
The sum of the two terms on the second row is the marginal expected distortion of consumption and investment in a partially integrated market. The term on the …rst row is the marginal insurance e¤ect. It is zero if the strike price is below the industry's break-even price so that the …nancial market already o¤ers complete insurance (B(s ) = 0 for all s ). The marginal insurance e¤ect is strictly negative when the …rm is exposed to price risk (s > ). Recall that the welfare bene…t of an increase in the capacity reserve works through the reduction in the maximal price, P 0 M (k) < 0, when there are no …nancial contracts; see Proposition 1. This security of supply bene…t vanishes under option contracting because then it is the strike price s that marks the maximal price for the electricity intensive industry. The only remaining e¤ect of the capacity reserve is to crowd out market-based investment in thermal capacity, which increases the likelihood that the price cannot clear in the market. Crowding-out represents the …rst term in (20) above. Hence, (the proof is in Appendix A.6):
Proposition 6 Assume that consumers can hedge risk by purchasing call options in a competitive …nancial market that renders the equilibrium option price equal to the expected option payment. The socially optimal capacity reserve k f b ( ; s) is zero for any degree of market integration 2 [0; 1] and any option strike price s < 1. The social optimum can be implemented as a pay-o¤ dominant Nash equilibrium if countries set capacity reserves non-cooperatively to maximize domestic welfare.
Financial markets completely remove the need for capacity reserves because they distort prices and investments without providing any hedging bene…ts beyond what can be achieved through …nancial contracting alone. The e¢ ciency of energy-only markets does not hinge upon …nancial markets being able to hedge all consumers'price risk (s ). All that matters is that the price risk is bounded (s < 1). The expected shadow cost of losses is driven to zero as capacity reserves become small because the probability F M (k) of supply scarcity vanishes.
There are no ine¢ ciencies associated with decentralized policy making, not even under incomplete market integration. No country has anything to gain by unilaterally introducing a capacity market in an energy-only market with …nancial contracting because there are no domestic hedging bene…ts to be achieved, only distortions.
Proposition 6 points to at least two reasons why countries would introduce capacity markets in a market with …nancial contracting. Domestic policy makers could have other objectives than to maximize the sum of domestic consumer and producer surplus. If, for example, the expected pro…t of the energy intensive industry weighs more heavily than the other groups in the economy, a motive for introducing a capacity mechanism would be to push down the expected option payment and thereby reduce the cost to the industry of …nancial contracting.
An e¢ ciency argument in favour of capacity markets arises in an imperfect …nancial market unable to hedge all risk. There could for instance be volume risk, which I have ignored by assuming constant demand q n . But there could also be remaining price risk. Assume that the sellers of …nancial contracts cannot diversify away all risk. To facilitate comparison with the analysis in Section 3, assume that B( ) now denotes the shadow cost of losses faced by the sellers of the option contracts, whereasB( ) represents the industry's shadow cost. 24 In a competitive …nancial market, the option price equals the expected option payment plus the risk correction: The option price will be very high in an energy-only market if B( ) is large for large option payments, even if the …nancial market is competitive and despite the option payment being bounded in expectation. 25 Capacity reserves again improve performance in the …nancial market by limiting market participants'exposure to price spikes. The welfare e¤ect of a small increase in the capacity reserve equals @W (k; s) @k = SS I (k; s) + (1 )SS N (k; s)
This trade-o¤ is qualitatively similar to the one that arises with consumer risk aversion, but no …nancial markets. A minor di¤erence is that the reference price now equals the strike price s instead of the industry break-even price . If s = , then the solution is exactly the same as in Proposition 3. Hence, it is only under strong assumptions about the …nancial market in terms of competitiveness and the diversi…ability of risk that the need for capacity reserves vanishes.
6 National allocation rules for capacity reserves I have so far assumed that all available capacity reserves are used in an e¢ cient manner under market integration, independently of where the system is constrained the most. In this section, I instead assume that countries are responsible for handling their own supply problems separately.
This change is of no consequence in a situation with national markets, because then there would be no ‡ow of electricity between the countries anyway. For illustration, consider therefore the opposite polar case of perfect market integration.
In a perfectly integrated market, total consumption q and market-based investment x < q are identical in the two countries independently of the how supply constraints are handled because all consumers and producers face identical prices. There is enough thermal capacity to clear the market if and only if r q x. In the opposite case of a supply constrained market, I de…ne 2 4 Now there is risk aversion both on the seller and buyer side. A su¢ cient condition for gains from trade in the …nancial markets given s > isB(p ) B (s ) > B(p s) for allp > s. 2 5 It is easy to verify that lim k!0 v(k; k; s) lim k!0 u 0 (qI (k) qn) + (1 ) lim k!0 u 0 (qN (k) qn) < 1.
the national supply constraint in country i as maxfq x r i ; 0g if r < q x and r j < q x 2(q x) r 1 r 2 if r < q x and r j q x.
Country i faces a national supply constraint only if the domestic market-based supply is insuf-…cient to cover the domestic demand: x + r i < q. If this situation occurs also in country j, then the domestic excess demand de…nes the national supply constraint in both countries. If instead country j has excess supply, x + r j q, then the national supply constraint in country i is the di¤erence between the domestic excess demand and net imports.
The price cap P I (k) of Section 2 was de…ned to generate precisely enough market-based thermal investment x I (k) to cover residual demand q I (k) k in the worst case scenario without renewable production anywhere and if the two countries have the same capacity reserve, k 1 = k 2 = k. If the two countries have chosen di¤erent capacity reserves, k 1 6 = k 2 , then P I (k) is still necessary and su¢ cient to ensure the security of supply in both markets if now k = minfk 1 ; k 2 g.
The symmetry of demand and market-based thermal investment implies that total thermal output only depends on k = minfk 1 ; k 2 g even if k 1 6 = k 2 . In this case, there is excess thermal capacity k i minfk 1 ; k 2 g in one country. Importantly, the thermal production for symmetric capacity reserves k 1 = k 2 = k, where I (k) represents the production ine¢ ciency associated with the national supply constraint, and 0 I (k) = ! I (k sb I )q 0 I (k sb I ) > 0 is the corresponding marginal production ine¢ ciency; see equations (26) and (27) in Appendix A.7 for a characterization and a proof of the following:
Proposition 7 Assume that electricity markets are perfectly integrated, but supply constraints are de…ned at the national level. Any constrained socially optimal capacity reserve satis…es k sb I < k f b I and is characterized by:
The constrained social optimum can be implemented as a pay-o¤ dominant Nash equilibrium if countries set capacity reserves non-cooperatively to maximize domestic welfare.
National allocation rules imply that the socially optimal capacity reserve k sb I falls below the level k f b I that would arise under an e¢ cient dispatch of capacity reserves because the marginal distortion associated with a capacity reserve is larger in the former case. However, there are no particular distortions associated with decentralized policy making in the perfectly integrated market. Symmetry across countries and the fact that the price cap P I (k) is determined by the minimal capacity reserve k = minfk 1 ; k 2 g imply that each country internalizes all welfare e¤ects by the unilaterally optimal choice of capacity reserve.
Policy discussion
This paper has studied countries'unilateral incentives for increasing security of supply by means of capacity reserves and network investment in a two-country model of interconnected electricity markets with ‡uctuating renewable production. Capacity reserves o¤er consumers protection against price spikes and running blackouts in situations of renewable production shortfalls, but also distort long-run investment and consumption decisions in the market. Network reinforcements reduce national supply constraints, but are costly.
A …rst …nding is that a non-cooperative choice of capacity reserves not necessarily is inef-…cient. National policy makers e¤ectively internalize the foreign externalities if countries are symmetric, perfectly integrated, and capacity reserves are deployed in an e¢ cient matter. Hence, necessary conditions for ine¢ cient policy making are country asymmetries and/or imperfectly integrated markets. This paper emphasizes distortions associated with market integration.
Equilibrium capacity reserves can be too large or too small in an imperfectly integrated market depending on the relative magnitude of two cross-border externalities. On the one hand, a larger foreign capacity reserve bene…ts the home country by improving supply security in the entire market. Free-riding on foreign capacity reserves tends to generate capacity reserves that are too small. On the other hand, a larger domestic capacity reserve exacerbates consumption and investment distortions abroad. Such international spill-overs cause excessive capacity reserves.
Because of these ambiguous e¤ects, it is impossible to make general recommendations about whether countries should be encouraged to increase domestic capacity reserves or discouraged from doing so. The net e¤ect depends quantitatively on the strength of a portfolio relative to a cost e¢ ciency e¤ect of market integration.
Network underinvestment is a pervasive problem. First of all, congestion rent is an inappropriate measure of the social value of network reinforcements to increase system reliability.
For instance, congestion rents are always zero in the present model independently of network reliability. Hence, the optimal level of network investment cannot be decided on the basis of market signals alone. Centralizing the choice of network investment improves matters because of the positive foreign externalities associated with improved market integration. However, even a regulation that causes network owners to invest in order to maximize total welfare is insu¢cient if countries choose capacity reserves non-cooperatively. In light of this …nding, the current EU guidelines for cross-border interconnections subject to which (European Union, 2013, p.44) "[t]he costs for the development, construction, operation and maintenance of projects of com-mon interest should in general be fully borne by the users of the infrastructure" are likely to be suboptimal from a social welfare perspective. One way to reduce the ine¢ ciency of domestically chosen capacity reserves is to establish a regulation that induces network investors to attach a stronger weight to the marginal value of increased market integration relative to the cost of improving the network and thus to overinvest all else equal. This suggests that users should either pay in excess of the full network costs, or network investment should be subsidized at central EU level to o¤set the distortions associated with capacity reserves.
A major bene…t of capacity reserves is to shelter consumers against short-term price spikes in the market. This bene…t is reduced if consumers also can hedge price risk in a …nancial market. Financial contracting thus reduces the need for capacity mechanisms. Put di¤erently, a larger share of the thermal investment necessary to ensure security of supply can be left to the market if consumers have the possibility to insure themselves against the price spikes necessary to accomplish this investment. In fact, the optimal capacity reserve is close to zero in the limit when the …nancial market is e¢ cient and able to absorb all price risk. 26 A fundamental property of an e¢ cient market design therefore is the development of an e¢ cient …nancial market (European Commission, 2016) . However, this market is more likely to develop if capacity reserves are in place to protect market participants against extreme prices. Consequently, capacity and …nancial markets are not necessarily substitutes for one another.
The socially optimal and equilibrium capacity reserves are smaller when reserves are deployed solely to resolve domestic supply constraints, because the marginal thermal production cost associated with capacity reserves then is higher than necessary. A national perspective on supply constraints therefore transforms into larger than necessary price spikes to ensure the security of supply in an integrated electricity market with large shares of renewable production.
Instead, a multinational approach to capacity mechanisms increases e¢ ciency and the security of supply, for instance a system in which domestic capacity reserves can be invoked so as to The only di¤erence between this price and (1) in the main text is the inclusion of the twice continuously di¤erentiable and increasing functionp( ) in a small interval r 2 ((q x)(1 "); q x).
In particular,p(x) = c(x) andp(q" + x(1 ")) = p. The purpose is to avoid uninteresting and complicating discontinuities around the point of full capacity utilization, r = q x. All results in the main text are limiting results for " ! 0.
The optimality conditions
jointly de…ne the equilibrium household demand D M ( p) and market-based investment X M ( p).
Straightforward di¤erentiation of the two conditions yields:
Combine the two market-clearing conditions to get
Hence, the demand in the energy-only market,
whereas the market-based investment level satis…es X 1 M = lim p!1 X M ( p) = D 1 M + q n < 1. 
Straightforward di¤erentiation of q M (k) = D M ( P M (k)) + q n yields
A.2 Capacity payments
The activated capacity reserve is sold in the wholesale market at the administered price. Hence,
represents the minimal capacity payment necessary to procure the desired capacity reserve k and ensure supply security at the price cap P N (k) when electricity markets are national.
The minimal capacity payment necessary to implement a capacity reserve of k in both countries under perfect market integration is given by
The renewable output in country 2 is large enough to clear the market independently of renewable output in country 1 if r 2 minf2k; rg. At the other extreme, the capacity reserve in country Implementation. This is trivial when electricity markets are national because then there is no strategic interaction between the policy makers in the two countries, and assuming that national policy makers choose the capacity reserve to maximize the domestic welfare. In the case of perfect market integration, expected welfare in country i equals W I ( By the de…nition of k M in (4) and assumption (6), it follows that M (k; ) 2 (k(1 "); k) if
. (13) is satis…ed, whereas the terms on the last three rows of the above expression are negligible for " su¢ ciently close to zero. Assume …rst that
All inequalities are reversed if inequality (13) is reversed.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Uniqueness Let Z(k; t; ) = 1+t 2 W 0 I (k) + (1 )W 0 N (k). We already know from Lemma 1 that any solution Z( ; t; ) = 0 must satisfy (t; ) 2 [minfk f b N ; k f b I g; maxfk f b N ; k f b I g] and that there exists at least one such solution (t; ) for every (t; ) 2 [0; 1] 2 . Strict concavity of W I (k) and
imply that (t; ) is unique. In particular, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium candidate k ( ) = (0; ) which is, moreover,
Existence Assume that k j = k ( ), and consider country i's incentive to deviate from k ( ). It can never be optimal for i to deviate to k i > 2 maxf k N ( ); k I ( )g k ( ) because then k i +k ( ) 2 > k I and k i > k N so that P I ( k i +k ( ) 2 ) < and P N (k i ) < . In this case, country i only distorts investment and consumption at home without o¤ering any additional insurance bene…ts to the domestic industry. Next,
for all k i 2 (0; 2 maxf k N ; k I g k ( )] by assumption (9), and k ( ) 2 (0; 2 maxf k N ; k I g k ( )]
imply that k i = k ( ) is country i's unique best-reply to k j = k ( ).
Characterization The …rst-order condition Z( ; 0; ) = 0 uniquely characterizes the symmetric equilibrium k ( ) = (0; ), which is approximately equal to (19) for " close to zero. The comparative statics follow directly from (18) is non-negative for all (k i ; k j ) because the shadow cost is non-negative and @Ŵ (k i ; k j ) @k i = 2 I (k)q 0 I (k) (1 ) N (k)q 0 N (k i ) < 0, @Ŵ (k i ; k j ) @k j = 2 I (k)q 0 I (k) 0 implyŴ (0; 0) Ŵ (k i ; k j ) for all (k i ; k j ). W (0; 0; s) W (k i ; k j ; s) for all (k i ; k j ) implies that 
The rules for resolving supply constraints matter if and only if r j < minf2k; rg and r i < 2k r j because the market clears supply and demand and delivers e¢ cient dispatch q I (k) r of the thermal production in both countries in the other events. The …rst three expressions in I (k) cover a situation with an aggregate supply constraint r < k, but either r 1 k or r 2 k, so that only the capacity reserve in one country is activated. The …nal expression identi…es the situation with a national supply constraint in both countries. The two expressions 1I (k) and 2I (k) are strictly positive by c 0 (z) > 0 and 1 2 (2q I (k) x I (k) 2r) + 1 2 x I (k) = q I (k) r = 1 2 (q I (k) r i ) + 1 2 (q I (k) r j ).
The cost distortion is strictly increasing in k: 
is strictly positive for k 2 (0; r). To see this second result, note that @ 2I (k;r i ;r j ) @k after simpli…cation. The term on the …rst row is positive, the term on the second row is nonnegative for k su¢ ciently close to zero by the assumption that f 0 M (r) 0 for all r su¢ ciently close to zero. The …rst term on the third row is also positive. It then follows that
for all k su¢ ciently close to zero. By the additional assumption that limp !1 B 0 (p ) B(p ) > 0, it follows that the term inside the square brackets on the second row of (33) is strictly positive and bounded away from zero for all k su¢ ciently close to zero. Finally, evaluate the terms on the …rst row of (33). From (25), it follows directly that 
